Critical Analysis of the I MEF Intelligence Performance in the 1991 Persian Gulf War [open pdf - 108KB]
Prior to Desert Storm, the I MEF theoretical capability to conduct intelligence operations appeared considerable. Despite no doctrinal foundation, the newly established Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Intelligence Group (SRIG) seemed capable of providing commanders with credible combat support. By the beginning of Desert Storm, major CINC imposed restrictions, changes to the MEF operations plan, and an immaturely developed SRIG severely challenged MEF intelligence planners. Although the CINC had significantly relaxed pre-G-Day restrictions by the start of Desert Storm, some were still in place to hamper MEF intelligence operations. Also, manpower and systems support within the MEF G-2 and the CENTCOM J-2 Staff contributed to a debilitating dissemination bottleneck that existed throughout the campaign. Conclusion. I MEF did not have the doctrinal foundation and existing structure to effectively fulfill the intelligence needs of a reinforced MEF in a land campaign. Also, training, manning, systems support and other deficiencies contributed significantly to the MEF G-2's and the 1st SRIG's inability to effectively respond to the intelligence requirements of commanders at all levels. As a result of post war analysis, the Marine Corps plans to improve its intelligence apparatus by developing pertinent doctrine, enhancing educational opportunities, modernizing support systems and reshaping the manpower structure.
Federation of American Scientists (FAS) http://www.fas.org