This report is a critique of the first Joint Inquiry Staff Report. Senators Jon Kyl and Pat Roberts provide additional views to the report. The senators state that, the investigation was deficient for what it did not include. While intelligence community failures were identified, they were presented frequently in a mode of "mistakes were made" rather than as the beginning of an inquiry as to why they were made. The record should also reflect some of the differences in opinion among Members on how the Report was (or should have been) prepared. Key figures in our counter-terrorism efforts were unnecessarily compromised by these public hearings. These inadequacies in the process resulted in a Report that falls well short of addressing the core problems that led to 9/11. The JIS did not examine risk aversion as a distinct and separate issue, despite the fact that several witnesses and interviewees told the staff that it was a big problem. The Report spends many pages cataloging why it is difficult to pinpoint how much money was expended on counter-terrorism; yet the document does not really grapple with the contradiction between the high-ranking officials' complaints about inadequate resources and the fact that, according to the Office of Management and Budget, the intelligence agencies usually got what they asked for. The authors examine the flawed legal and institutional framework and leadership failures and provide possible solutions.