This thesis examines fishery-based conflicts (FBCs) and the oceanic sovereignty implications of FBCs in a world devoid of the East-West superpower rivalry. The argument herein is that in the absence of the Cold War rivalry, previously lower-priority economic and diplomatic issues rise to the forefront of international relations. The analysis suggests that political stability and naval enforcement capability play a significant role in whether a nation will commit its naval forces to defend its national maritime claims. The Andean nations of Chile, Ecuador, and Peru (CEP) are the subject of investigation because they possess several attributes theorized to lead to future FBCs. Recommendations are presented as a starting point in formulating a two-fold strategy which will (1) minimize the likelihood of FBCs, and (2) respect the sovereignty of South American nations. Case studies of previous fishery-based conflicts are examined to determine the validity of the "Small Navy Theory". Also examined in this thesis are the potential roles of the United States Navy and Coast Guard in protecting US fishing interest and/or functioning as the lead organizations for a UN-sponsored peacekeeping operation in the southeastern Pacific Ocean.
Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC): http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/