Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction   [open pdf - 389KB]

Alternate Title: Key Judgments [from October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate]

The pages contained in this document are excerpts from a 90+ page National Intelligence Estimate released in October 2002. The key judgments from the National Intelligence Estimate were declassified on July 18, 2003 and presented at a White House background briefing on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The report was compiled by six intelligence agencies that pulled together all of their information. The analytical judgments contained in this report are a critical resource for policymakers. Overall, the report presents a clear and compelling case for aggressively pursuing the war on terror both in Afghanistan as well as Iraq. This document, however, also contains the INR's alternative view which states that given the lack of persuasive evidence; the INR is not prepared to speculate as to whether Iraq began "a coherent effort to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program" and is "unable to predict when Iraq could acquire a nuclear device or weapon."

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