"Throughout America's Lebanon adventure, US intelligence analysts, particularly CIA analysts, were uncommonly convinced that much of the administration's policy was misguided and ill fated. They eagerly awaited the administration's call for Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE), the premier instrument of US intelligence analysis, in which they might spell out the evidence and reasoning behind their reservations. While they waited, they pushed other established channels of communication, and their professional proprieties, to the limit in an attempt to et their message through. But dissatisfaction with Lebanon intelligence was almost universal: policymakers felt increasingly ill served, and analysts felt increasingly ill used. The two sides agreed only, if for different reasons, that intelligence analysis was not playing its proper role. The intelligence process may not, in the end, have offered up many insights about Lebanon, but Lebanon, in retrospect, says a great deal about the intelligence process."
Center for the Study of Intelligence: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/index.html
Studies in Intelligence (1994), v.37 no.5