The nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, has been a major element in the foreign policy of the Clinton Administration. For this reason, the Administration placed considerable emphasis on obtaining the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on the occasion of its 25-year review and extension in April-May 1995. For a range of foreign policy reasons, including nuclear nonproliferation, another clear and important goal of the Administration has been dual containment' of both Iran and Iraq. This paper will consider the process of implementing these two policies in the run-up to both NPT Review and Extension Conference and the announcement of a complete trade and investment embargo on Iran, two events that occurred at the same time. It will demonstrate how bureaucratic and domestic political factors helped lead the Administration to take action on one policy, containing Iran, that could have jeopardized success on the second, NPT extension, and seek to draw some lessons from that experience.