"Deterrence is not a passive concept; it must be stepped up in proportion to an adversary's increases in arsenal or delivery means. For reasons all too well known, Pakistan's principal security perceptions will remain India-centric. To keep deterrence credible, the indispensability of continuously bolstering Pakistan's nuclear assets, including delivery means, cannot be overstressed. The international community would react sharply were Pakistan to field a sea-based nuclear deterrent, given the country's security situation and fears of radicalization (real or imaginary) in Western minds. Timing, therefore, is crucial. Pakistan is currently too dependent on the American and multilateral financial institutions for keeping its economy afloat, and that situation is not likely to alter for the next few years. But if the issue is not addressed, Pakistan's hard-earned nuclear stability may erode beyond recovery. The role of armed forces was once to win a war if diplomacy had failed; in the nuclear age their role is to prevent warfare from breaking out. Despite being on the wrong side of history, Pakistan has no option but to take some hard decisions."
|Author:||Khan, Muhammad Azam|
|Publisher:||Naval War College (U.S.)|
|Retrieved From:||Naval War College: http://usnwc.edu|
|Source:||Naval War College Review (Summer 2010), v.63 no.3, p.85-104|