"Ultra intelligence derived from the decryption of high-level German military communications nets provided the Allied forces defending Crete with extraordinary warning of the impending German air assault in May 1941. Despite the advantage of this warning, the Allies' defense of Crete was unsuccessful. Examination of the preparations for the battle and of the available intelligence reveals shortcomings in the linkage between intelligence and operations which reduced the battlefield commander's ability to use the intelligence provided to him. Five intelligence lessons learned from the Battle for Crete are the need to plan to ensure continuous availability of intelligence throughout an operation, the criticality of communications to intelligence, the need for the commander to understand intelligence to use it effectively, the problems associated with source protection, and the inevitability of ambiguity in intelligence."
|Author:||Perlberg, Miriam F.|
|Publisher:||Naval War College (U.S.)|
|Retrieved From:||Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC): http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/|